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The	 Environmental,	 Democratic,	 and	 Rule-of-Law	 Implications	 of	 Harper’s	 Environmental	
Assessment	Legacy		
	
Jocelyn	Stacey1	
	
Introduction	
	
Canada’s	 leading	 environmental	 law	 scholars	 have	 identified	Harper’s	 legacy	 as	 a	 full-
scale	attack	on	the	environment,2	one	that	simultaneously	diminished	the	federal	government’s	
role	 in	 environmental	 protection	 and	 sought	 to	 increase	 federal	 influence	 over	 resource	
development.	 Indeed,	 the	 list	 of	measures	 and	 actions	 taken	 by	 the	Harper	 government	 that	
undermine	environmental	 protection	 is	 striking:	 The	 federal	 role	 in	 conducting	 environmental	
assessment	 was	 radically	 reduced3	as	 was	 its	 role	 in	 protecting	 navigable	 waters.4	Fisheries	
protections	 were	 narrowed. 5 	New	 regulation-making	 authority	 was	 exempt	 from	 ordinary	
procedural	 requirements,	 for	 no	 apparent	 reason.6	Ocean	 dumping	 controls	 were	 relaxed.7	
Critical	 habitat	 requirements	 for	 species	 at	 risk	were	 loosened.8	The	 government	 systemically	
failed	 to	 develop	 recovery	 strategies	 for	 species	 at	 risk,	 contrary	 to	 legislative	 requirements.9	
The	government	formally	withdrew	from	the	Kyoto	Protocol10	and	repealed	the	Kyoto	Protocol	
Implementation	Act.11	The	authority	to	deny	interprovincial	pipeline	approvals	was	moved	from																																																									
1	Jocelyn	Stacey	is	an	assistant	professor	of	law	at	the	Peter	A.	Allard	School	of	Law	at	the	University	of	
British	Columbia.	Thanks	to	Steve	Patten	and	two	anonymous	reviewers	for	helpful	feedback	and	to	
Alexandra	Catchpole	for	excellent	research	assistance.	All	errors	remain	my	own.	
2	Jason	Maclean,	Meinhard	Doelle	and	Chris	Tollefson,	“The	Past,	Present	and	Future	of	Canadian	
Environmental	Law:	A	Critical	Dialogue”	(2016)	1:1	Lakehead	LJ	79;	Lynda	M.	Collins	and	David	R.	Boyd,	
“Non-Regression	and	the	Charter	Right	to	a	Healthy	Environment”	(2016)	29	JELP	287.	
3	This	is	the	focus	of	this	article,	see	Part	II	infra	for	an	overview	of	the	most	significant	changes.	
4	Bill	C-45,	A	second	Act	to	implement	certain	provisions	of	the	budget	tabled	in	Parliament	on	March	29,	
2012	and	other	measures,	1st	Sess,	41st	Parl,	2012,	cls	173-178	(assented	to	14	December	2012),	SC	2012,	
c	31	[Jobs	and	Growth	Act]	[online].	Available	from:	
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=5942521&File=
4;	Amanda	K	Winegardner,	Emma	E	Hodgson	and	Adrienne	M	Davidson,	“Reductions	in	Federal	Oversight	
of	Aquatic	Systems	in	Canada:	Implications	of	the	New	Navigation	Protection	Act”	(2015)	72	Can	J.	
Fisheries	&	Aquatic	Science	602.	
5	Bill	C-38,	An	Act	to	implement	certain	provisions	of	the	budget	tabled	in	Parliament	on	March	29,	2012	
and	other	measures,	1st	Sess,	41st	Parl,	2012,	cls	132-156	(assented	to	29	June	2012),	SC	2012,	c	19	[Jobs,	
Growth,	and	Long-Term	Prosperity	Act]	[online].	Available	from:	
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docid=5697420&file=4;	Jason	Unger,	
“Lamenting	What	we	HADD?	A	Fisheries	Act	Habitat	Dirge	or	Much	Ado	about	Nothing”	(2016)	29	JELP	1;	
Martin	ZP	Olszynski,	“From	‘Badly	Wrong’	to	Worse:	An	Empirical	Analysis	of	Canada’s	New	Approach	to	
Fish	Habitat	Protection	Laws”	(2015)	28	JELP	1	[Olszynski	Fisheries].	
6	Fisheries	Act,	RSC	1985,	c	F-14	ss	35(4),	43(4).	
7	Jobs,	Growth,	and	Long-Term	Prosperity	Act,	supra	note	5	cls	316-350.	
8	Ibid	at	cls	163-169;	Species	at	Risk	Act,	SC	2002,	C	29,	s	77(1).			
9	Western	Canadian	Wilderness	Committee	v	Canada	(Fisheries	and	Oceans),	2014	FC	148	at	para	85.	
10	Jobs,	Growth,	and	Long-Term	Prosperity	Act,	supra	note	5	cl	699.		
11	Ibid	at	s	699.		
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the	National	 Energy	Board	 to	 federal	Cabinet.12	The	National	Roundtable	on	Environment	and	
Economy,	 a	 government	 advisory	 body	 on	 sustainable	 development,	 was	 disbanded. 13	
Environmental	 non-governmental	 organizations	were	 targeted	 for	 auditing	 on	 their	 charitable	
status.14	The	 Experimental	 Lakes	 Area,	 a	 world-class	 research	 facility,	 was	 defunded.15	Library	
materials	from	Fisheries	and	Oceans	Canada	were	destroyed.16	The	RCMP	and	CSIS	engaged	 in	
coordinated,	 covert	 surveillance	 of	 peaceful	 activities	 by	 environmental	 and	 Indigenous	
groups.17	Government	 scientists	 were	 muzzled.18	The	 budgets	 for	 Environment	 Canada	 and	
Fisheries	and	Oceans	were	slashed.19	
	
Collectively	 these	measures	 result	 in	 a	 radical	 reduction	 of	 the	 federal	 government’s	
role	in	environmental	protection.	They	appear	to	reflect	an	assumption	of	a	zero-sum	trade-off	
between	 resource	 development	 and	 environmental	 protection.	 Others	 have	 argued	 they	 are	
part	of	a	concerted	effort	to	subsume	“the	environment”	under	“a	singular	resource	extraction	
paradigm.”20	The	argument	advanced	here	is	that	that	the	precise	changes	to	environment	law	
not	only	 reflect	 this	 substantive	vision	of	 the	environment,	 they	also	 represent	an	attempt	 to	
exempt	 environmental	 decisions	 from	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Underlying	 this	
argument	 is	 the	 premise	 that	 a	 democratic	 government	 committed	 to	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 must	
publicly	 justify	 its	decisions	on	 the	basis	of	 core	 constitutional	principles,	 such	as	 fairness	and																																																									
12	Jobs,	Growth	and	Prosperity	Act,	supra	note	5	at	cls	104.	
13	Jobs,	Growth,	and	Long-Term	Prosperity	Act,	supra	note	5	at	cls	578-594.	
14	D	Tsao,	Z	Stoffman,	G	Lloyd-Smith,	K	Mohomoud	&	C	Sandborn,	Tax	Audits	of	Environmental	Groups:	
The	Pressing	Need	for	Law	Reform,	(Victoria:	University	of	Victoria	Environmental	Law	Centre,	2015).	
15	Diane	Orihel	&	David	Schindler,	“Experimental	Lakes	Area	is	Saved,	but	it’s	a	Bittersweet	Victory	for	
Science”,	The	Globe	and	Mail	(1	April	2014),	online:	
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/experimental-lakes-area-is-saved-but-its-a-bittersweet-
victory-for-science/article17753956/>	(the	facility	was	later	reopened	under	a	new	operator,	The	
International	Institute	for	Sustainable	Development).		
16	Gloria	Galloway,	“Purge	of	Canada’s	fisheries	libraries	a	‘historic’	loss,	scientists	say”	(7	Jan	2014)	The	
Globe	and	Mail	online:	<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/purge-of-canadas-fisheries-
libraries-a-historic-loss-scientists-say/article16237051/>	.	
17	Shawn	McCarthy,	“CSIS,	RCMP	monitored	activist	groups	before	Northern	Gateway	hearings”	(21	
November	2013),	The	Globe	and	Mail	online:	<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
business/industry-	news/energy-and-resources/csis-rcmp-monitored-activists-for-risk-before-enbridge-
hearings/article15555935/>.		
18	E.g.	Jonathon	Gatehouse,	“When	science	goes	silent”	(3	May	2013),	Macleans	online:	
<http://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/when-science-goes-silent/>.	
19Environment	and	Climate	Change	Canada,	2014-2015	Report	on	Plans	and	Priorities,	(Government	of	
Canada)	online:	<https://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=024B8406-1&offset=3&toc=show#s3>	
and	Peter	O’Neil	and	Gordon	Hoekstra,	“Federal	budget	cuts	$100	million	from	fisheries	and	oceans	over	
three	years”	(21	Mar	2013)	The	Vancouver	Sun	online:	
<http://www.vancouversun.com/news/Federal+budget+cuts+million+from+fisheries+oceans+over+three
+years/8133846/story.html>.	
20	Jonathan	Petyon	and	Aaron	Franks,	“The	New	Nature	of	Things?	Canada’s	Conservative	Government	
and	the	Design	of	the	New	Environmental	Subject”	(2016)	48:2	Antipode	453	at	456.	See	also	Denis	
Kirchhoff	and	Leonard	JS	Tsuji,	“Reading	Between	the	Lines	of	the	‘Responsible	Resource	Development’	
Rhetoric:	The	Use	of	Omnibus	Bills	to	‘Streamline’	Canadian	Environmental	Legislation”	(2014)	32:2	
Impact	Assessment	and	Project	Appraisal	108	at	110[Kirchhoff	and	Tsuji].	
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reasonableness.	 This	 rule-of-law	 requirement	 is	 most	 clearly	 reflected	 in	 section	 1	 of	 the	
Charter,	 but	 is	 also	 the	 core	 commitment	 contained	 within	 our	 common	 law	 constitution,	
realized,	in	part,	through	the	courts’	administrative	law	function	of	judicial	review.21		
	
The	 obligation	 to	 give	 publicly-regarding	 reasons	 (i.e.	 reasons	 that	 are	 not	 solely	 self-
interested	and	that	can	be	accepted	by	others)	is	also	the	consensus	point	amongst	theorists	of	
deliberative	democracy,	who	espouse	“an	ideal	of	politics	where	people	routinely	relate	to	one	
another…	 by	 influencing	 each	 other	 through	 the	 publicly	 valued	 use	 of	 reasoned	 argument,	
evidence,	evaluation	and	persuasion.”22	Thus	 the	 requirement	of	public	 justification	 lies	at	 the	
intersection	of	the	rule	of	 law	and	deliberative	democracy.23	Public	 justification	takes	seriously	
the	 capacity	 of	 legal	 subjects—those	 subject	 to	 the	 law—to	 “reason	 with	 the	 law.”24	It	 both	
respects	and	enables	 individual	autonomy	by	protecting	 legal	subjects	 from	arbitrary	decision-
making	and	also	facilitating	their	participation	in	the	ongoing	project	of	contesting	(or	not)	and	
deliberating	upon	the	content	of	the	law.	On	this	view,	individual	participation	is	inherent	within	
legal	authority.		
	
The	 crux	 of	 this	 article	 is	 that	 environmental	 assessment	 law	 provides	 an	 essential	
framework	 for	 publicly-justified	 decision-making	 in	 the	 Canadian	 environmental	 context.	 This	
means	 that	 the	 Harper-led	 changes	 to	 environmental	 assessment	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 an	
attempt	to	exempt	environmental	decision-makers	from	the	basic	requirements	of	a	democratic	
conception	of	the	rule	of	law.	The	article	focuses	specifically	on	environmental	assessment	law,	
rather	than	a	broader	suite	of	Harper’s	environmental	measures,	for	several	reasons.	Rewriting	
Canadian	environmental	assessment	 legislation	was	a	cornerstone	of	the	Harper	government’s	
environmental	legacy.	It	was	a	comprehensive	change	to	a	single	piece	of	legislation	that	nicely	
captures	the	Harper	vision	of	a	narrow	federal	 role,	a	narrow	understanding	of	environmental	
protection,	 and	 a	 capitulation	 to	 the	 federal	 government’s	 resource	 development	 agenda.	
Furthermore,	 environmental	 assessment	 laws	 are	 often	 thought	 of	 as	 the	 “mainframe	 of	
environmental	 law.”25	Indeed,	 as	 I	 suggest	 in	 this	 article,	 environmental	 assessment	 presently	
performs	 a	 quasi-constitutional	 role	 in	 Canadian	 environmental	 decision-making	 in	 the	 sense	
that	it	provides	an	indispensable	framework	for	public	justification.	
		
The	article	argues	that	Harper’s	dramatic	changes	to	federal	environmental	assessment	
give	 rise	 to	 a	 two-dimensional	 legacy	 in	 environmental	 law:	 first,	 a	 legacy	 of	 impoverished																																																									
21	Evan	Fox-Decent,	“Democratizing	Common	Law	Constitutionalism”	(2010)	55	McGill	LJ	513	at	513.	
22	Amy	Gutmann,	“Democracy”	in	Robert	Goodin,	Philip	Pettit	and	Thomas	Pogge,	eds,	A	Companion	to	
Contemporary	Political	Philosophy	(Oxford:	Blackwell	Publishing,	2007)	521	at	527.	
23	Jocelyn	Stacey,	“The	Promise	of	the	Rule	of	(Environmental)	Law”	53:2	OHLJ	[forthcoming	in	2016];	
David	Dyzenhaus,	“The	Legitimacy	of	Legality”	(1996)	46	UTLJ	129	[Dyzenhaus	Legitimacy];	Hoi	Kong,	
“Election	Law	and	Deliberative	Democracy:	Against	Deflation”	(2015)	9	JPPL	35	[Kong].	
24	Kristen	Rundle,	Forms	Liberate:	Reclaiming	the	Jurisprudence	of	Lon	L	Fuller	(Oxford	and	Portland:	Hart	
Publishing,	2012)	at	10;	Kong,	supra	note	23	at	41.	
25	Jane	Holder,	Environmental	Assessment:	the	Regulation	of	Decision-Making	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	
Press,	2004)	at	1	[Holder].	
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environmental	 decision-making	 that	 reflects	 a	 narrow,	 resource-oriented	 vision	 of	 the	
environment,	 and	 second,	 a	 legacy	 of	 undermining	 democratic	 and	 rule-of-law	 values	 in	
environmental	 law.	 This	 argument	 unfolds	 through	 three	 parts.	 The	 first	 part	 introduces	 the	
basic	 structure,	 purpose	 and	 practice	 of	 environmental	 assessment.	 It	 argues	 that	
environmental	assessment	 is	best	understood	as	providing	a	framework	for	public	 justification	
in	environmental	decision-making.	And	it	identifies	how	a	misunderstanding	of	this	justificatory	
function	 paved	 the	way	 for	 criticism—from	 all	 sides—of	 Canadian	 environmental	 assessment	
law.	 The	 second	 part	 introduces	 Harper’s	 major	 changes	 to	 Canadian	 environmental	
assessment.	Drawing	on	existing	 literature,	 it	 argues	 that	one	aspect	of	 the	changes	 is	poorer	
environmental	decisions.	The	reduction	in	the	scope	and	rigour	of	environmental	assessment	in	
Canada	 leaves	 our	 public	 decision-makers	 less	 informed	 about	 the	 environmental	 effects	 of	
their	decisions.	The	third	part	extends	on	this	existing	environmental	commentary.	It	argues	that	
the	changes	to	federal	environmental	assessment	undermine	the	federal	government’s	ability	to	
offer	 adequate	 justification	 for	 its	 environmental	 decision,	 and	 thus	 suggest	 an	 attempt	 to	
exempt	the	government	from	the	ongoing	project	of	democratic	governance	under	the	rule	of	
law.	The	article	concludes	by	observing	 that	Harper’s	 legacy	 in	environmental	 law	has	created	
significant	challenges	for	reinstating	and	then	coordinating	robust	environmental	assessment	in	
the	Trudeau	era.	
	
	
I. Environmental	Assessment:	Publicly	Justifying	Environmental	Decisions	
	
Environmental	assessment	is	the	practice	of	studying,	understanding	and	attempting	to	predict	
the	 potential	 environmental	 effects	 of	 certain	 activities	 (e.g.	 developing	 a	 new	mine)	 before	
deciding	 whether	 these	 activities	 are	 allowed	 to	 proceed.	 It	 formalizes	 the	 common	 sense	
notion	 that	 we	 ought	 to	 ‘look	 before	 we	 leap’.	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 has	 described	
environmental	 assessment	 as	 “a	 planning	 tool	 that	 is	 now	 generally	 regarded	 as	 an	 integral	
component	of	sound	decision-making.”26	What	these	benign	descriptions	belie,	however,	is	the	
fact	that	environmental	assessment	carries	the	weight	of	much	of	the	hope	and	expectation	for	
environmental	 law	 more	 generally.	 Environmental	 assessment	 is	 intended	 to	 promote	
sustainable	development,27	facilitate	consultation	with	aboriginal	peoples,	coordinate	decision-
making	 between	 levels	 of	 government,	 and	 encourage	 public	 participation.28	But	 it	 is	 also	 an	
attempt	 to	 regularize	 and	 channel	 that	 which	 cannot	 easily	 be	 tamed.	 The	 very	 nature	 of	
environmental	 assessment	 brings	 to	 the	 surface	 heated	 debates	 about	 nature	 and	 natural																																																									
26	Friends	of	the	Oldman	River	Society	v	Canada	(Minister	of	Transport),	[1992]	1	SCR	3	[Oldman].	
27	Canadian	Environmental	Assessment	Act,	SC	1992,	c	37	at	s	4	[CEAA	1992]	and	Canadian	Environmental	
Assessment	Act,	SC	2012,	c	19,	s	52	at	s	4	[CEAA	2012].	Although	arguably	not	in	its	current	form:	
Meinhard	Doelle,	“The	Role	of	EA	in	Achieving	a	Sustainable	Energy	Future	in	Canada:	A	Case	Study	of	the	
Lower	Churchill	Panel	Review”	(2013)	25	JELP	113;	A	John	Sinclair,	Alan	Diduck	and	Patricia	Fitzpatrick,	
“Conceptualizing	Learning	for	Sustainability	through	Environmental	Assessment:	Critical	Reflections	on	15	
Years	of	Research”	(2008)	28	Environmental	Impact	Assessment	Review	415	at	417	(sustainability	as	the	
normative	end	point	of	environmental	assessment).	
28	Ibid	CEAA	1992,	s	4	and	CEAA	2012	at	s	4.	
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resources,	environmental	protection	and	development,	and	scientific,	 Indigenous	and	all	other	
ways	of	understanding	our	relationships	with	each	other	and	the	environment.	
	
In	 broad	 strokes,	 environmental	 assessment	 is	 generally	 comprised	 of	 anticipation,	
participation	and	the	determination	of	whether	a	proposal	is	 likely	to	cause	significant	adverse	
environmental	 effects.	 Environmental	 assessment	 requires	 gathering	 information	 about	 the	
project	 and	 its	 possible	 effects	 in	 order	 to	 anticipate	 the	 environmental	 consequences	 of	
approving	the	project.	It	typically	includes	some	form	of	public	participation,	which	incorporates	
information	 from	a	 range	of	 sources.	The	extent	and	depth	of	 the	assessment	varies	with	 the	
nature	 of	 the	 proposed	 project.	 Major	 development	 proposals	 attract	 more	 rigorous	
assessments	 than	 minor	 proposals.	 The	 end	 result	 of	 the	 assessment	 is	 a	 determination	 of	
whether	 the	 proposal	 is	 likely	 to	 cause	 significant	 adverse	 environmental	 effects,	 and	 if	 so,	
whether	 the	 project	 can	 nonetheless	 be	 justified. 29 	Because	 of	 this	 final	 determination,	
environmental	 assessment	 does	 not	 require	 decision-makers	 to	 reach	 any	 particular	 outcome	
(i.e.	even	projects	with	significant	negative	effects	may	be	justified	and	then	approved).	For	this	
reason,	environmental	 assessment	 is	often	characterized	as	essentially	procedural	 in	nature.30	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 environmental	 assessment	 serves	 (or	 ought	 to	 serve)	 underlying	
substantive	 objectives	 by	 providing	 a	 forum	 for	 explicitly	 considering	 whether	 the	 risks	 of	
projects	are	acceptable	and	whether	proposals	reflect	the	best	use	of	our	land	and	resources.31	
Often	 these	 processes	 lead	 to	 modifications	 in	 the	 project	 design	 and	 the	 incorporation	 of	
mitigating	conditions	intended	to	prevent	and	reduce	anticipated	environmental	harm.32	
	
Environmental	assessment	can	also	be	understood	as	providing	a	framework	for	publicly	
justifying	environmental	decisions	on	the	basis	of	underlying	constitutional	principles	of	fairness	
and	 reasonableness.	 The	 participatory	 component	 of	 environmental	 assessment	 –	 i.e.	 notice-
and-comment	or	public	hearings	–	creates	the	opportunity	for	those	affected	by	the	decision	to	
be	heard,	analogous	to	the	administrative	law	requirement	of	procedural	fairness.	At	the	same	
time,	the	assessment	can	generate	a	robust	pool	of	information	that	provides	a	reasoned	basis	
for	 the	 decision-maker’s	 determination	 of	 whether	 a	 project	 ought	 to	 proceed	 and	 on	 what	
conditions.	 In	 the	 Canadian	 context,	 one	 need	 not	 look	 further	 than	 the	 language	 of	 the	
Canadian	 Environmental	 Assessment	 Act	 2012	 (CEAA	 2012)	 to	 see	 that	 environmental	
assessment	ought	to	perform	a	justificatory	role.	Where	a	project	is	likely	to	result	in	significant	
																																																								
29	Ibid	CEAA	1992	at	ss	20(1)(b)	and	37(1)	and	CEAA	2012	at	s52(4).		
30	Holder,	supra	note	25	at	19-20;	Matthew	J	Lindstrom,	“Procedures	Without	Purpose:	The	Withering	
Away	of	the	National	Environmental	Policy	Act’s	Substantive	Law”	(2000)	20	J	Land	Resources	&	Envtl	L	
245.	
31	National	Environmental	Protection	Act	1969	(US)	§	4331(b)-(6);	Tsleil-Waututh	Nation,	“Tsleil-Waututh	
Stewardship	Policy”	online:	
<http://www.twnation.ca/About%20TWN/~/media/Files/Stewardship%20January%202009.ashx>.	
32	Meinhard	Doelle,	The	Federal	Environmental	Assessment	Process:	A	Guide	and	Critique	(Markham,	Ont:	
LexisNexis,	2008)	at	25,	n20	[Doelle	2008].	
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adverse	environmental	effects,	section	52(4)	requires	the	Governor	in	Council	to	decide	whether	
those	effects	“are	justified	in	the	circumstances.”33	
	
Environmental	assessment	legislation	is	distinct	from	other	environmental	statutes	and	
regulations	 in	that	 it	“is	a	planning	tool,	not	a	regulatory	tool.”34	The	distinction	is	one	of	both	
timing	and	purpose:	environmental	assessment	happens	at	an	early	stage	 in	order	to	consider	
the	need,	alternatives,	and	design	of	the	project.	In	contrast,	environmental	regulation	governs	
the	 operation	 of	 the	 project.	 There	 is	 an	 additional	 and	 significant	 distinction,	 at	 least	 in	 the	
Canadian	context,	in	that	environmental	regulatory	decisions	do	not,	at	present,	fulfill	the	rule-
of-law	requirement	of	public	 justification.	Regulatory	decisions	at	the	federal	 level	(e.g.	 issuing	
pollution	 permits,	 or	 authorizations	 to	 destroy	 fish	 habitat)	 are	 not,	 generally	 speaking,	
transparent,	publicly	accessible,	 reasoned,	or	 subject	 to	any	meaningful	 form	of	 review.35	This	
means	 that,	 in	Canada,	 environmental	 assessment	 is	 the	primary	means	by	which	 the	 federal	
government	 meets	 its	 rule-of-law	 obligation	 to	 publicly	 justify	 its	 environmental	 decisions.	
Environmental	assessment	can	thus	be	understood	as	having	a	quasi-constitutional	role	because	
it	provides	 the	means	through	which	the	government	can	 fulfill	 its	constitutional	obligation	to	
govern	according	to	the	rule	of	law.	
	
The	 courts,	 however,	 have	 largely	 overlooked	 this	 justificatory	 function	 and	 have	
instead	 viewed	 environmental	 assessment	 in	 largely	 technical	 and	 formal	 terms.	 The	 first	
Supreme	Court	of	Canada	decision	on	environmental	assessment	upheld	an	expansive	role	 for	
the	 federal	 government	 in	 conducting	 environmental	 assessment,	 even	 when	 predicted	
environmental	 effects	 pertained	 to	 matters	 of	 provincial	 jurisdiction.36		 At	 the	 same	 time,	
however,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 emphasized	 the	 essentially	 procedural	 nature	 of	 environmental	
assessment.	 Indeed	 a	 key	 distinction	 for	 the	 Court,	 between	 environmental	 assessment	 and	
regulation	(such	as	the	Fisheries	Act)	was	that	the	former	“is	fundamentally	procedural	while	the	
other	 is	 substantive	 in	 nature.”37	The	 Federal	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 has	 a	 long	 history	 of	 narrowly	
interpreting	 the	 requirements	 of	 environmental	 assessment	 legislation.	 Prominent	 decisions	
include	 deference	 to	 federal	 decision-makers	 narrowly	 “scoping”	 the	 proposed	 project	 to	
include	 only	 features	 requiring	 federal	 approval	 (e.g.	 the	 bridge	 crossing	 fish	 habitat,	 not	 the																																																									
33	CEAA	2012,	supra	note	27,	s	52(4).	
34	Doelle	2008,	supra	note	32	at	18.	
35	David	Boyd,	Unnatural	Law	(Vancouver:	UBC	Press,	2003)	at	233,	245-8;	Olszynski	Fisheries,	supra	note	
5	(relying	on	freedom	of	information	requests	to	access	Fisheries	Act	authorizations);	Jocelyn	Stacey,	“The	
Environmental	Emergency	and	the	Legality	of	Discretion	in	Environmental	Law”	(2015)	52:3	OHLJ	983	(on	
the	reluctance	of	courts	to	interfere	with	environmental	decisions	on	review).	The	Ontario	Bill	of	Rights	
[Environmental	Bill	of	Rights,	SO	1993,	c	28]	establishes,	at	least	on	paper,	more	robust	requirements	for	
environmental	decision-making.	But	see	Mark	Winfield,	“Decision-Making,	Governance	and	Sustainability	
Beyond	the	Age	of	‘Responsible	Resource	Development’”	(2016)	29	JELP	129	at	141-143	(on	the	ways	in	
which	these	requirements	are	being	circumvented	in	practice).	
36	Oldman,	supra	note	26;	Doelle	2008,	supra	note	32	at	67-75.	
37	Oldman,	supra	note	26	at	42;	MiningWatch	Canada	v	Canada	(Fisheries	and	Oceans),	2010	SCC	2	at	
para	14.		
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entire	 logging	 operation),38	and	 holding	 that	 an	 assessment	 will	 be	 unreasonable	 only	 if	 the	
decision-maker	 “gave	no	 consideration	 at	 all	 to	 [the]	 environmental	 effects.”39	More	 recently,	
the	Federal	Court	upheld	as	reasonable	the	Governor	in	Council’s	determination	that	the	effects	
of	 the	 Site	C	Dam	were	 “justified	 in	 the	 circumstances,”	 despite	 the	 fact	 the	decision	did	not	
explain	in	any	fashion	the	basis	for	that	conclusion.40			
	
Construed	 as	 a	 formal	 pre-approval	 exercise,	 rather	 than	 a	 rule-of-law	 imperative,	
environmental	assessment	is	easily	vulnerable	to	criticism.	Environmental	groups	argue	that	it	is	
toothless	and	unmoored	from	advancing	underlying	substantive	environmental	goals.41	Industry	
highlights	 its	 ineffectiveness	 at	 achieving	 environmental	 outcomes	 and	 argues	 that	
environmental	 assessment	 is	 wasteful,	 burdensome	 and	 leads	 to	 costly	 delays	 to	
development.42		 Joe	 Oliver,	 the	Minister	 of	 Natural	 Resources	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 changes	 to	
federal	environmental	assessment	 law,	stated	“[u]nfortunately,	our	 inefficient,	duplicative	and	
unpredictable	 regulatory	 system	 is	 an	 impediment	 [to	 diversifying	 Canada’s	 markets].	 It	 is	
complex,	slow-moving	and	wasteful.	It	subjects	major	projects	to	unpredictable	and	potentially	
endless	delays.”43	The	stage	was	set	for	Harper’s	environmental	assessment	legacy.	
	
	
II. The	Legacy	Part	I:	Impoverished	Environmental	Decisions	
	
Harper’s	 changes	 to	 the	 federal	 environmental	 assessment	 occurred	 in	 two	 waves.	 First	 the	
2010	 Budget	 Implementation	 Bill	 (Bill	 C-9)	 amended	 the	Canadian	 Environmental	 Assessment	
Act	 (CEAA)	 to	 increase	 the	 discretionary	 powers	 of	 Ministers	 conducting	 environmental	
assessments44	and	 to	 streamline	 various	 procedures.45	In	 addition,	 the	 bill	 exempted	 from	
environmental	 assessment	 all	 infrastructure	 projects	 contained	 in	 the	 stimulus	 package	 for	
responding	to	the	financial	crisis.46		The	timing	of	these	changes	was	odd	because	they	coincided	
																																																								
38	Friends	of	the	West	Country	Assn	v	Canada	(Minister	of	Fisheries	and	Oceans),	[2000]	2	FCR	263	[West	
Country];	Prairie	Acid	Rain	Coalition	v	Canada	(Minister	of	Fisheries	and	Oceans),	2006	FCA	31.	
39	Ontario	Power	Generation	Inc	v	Greenpeace	Canada,	2015	FCA	186	at	para	130.	
40	Peace	Valley	Landowner	Association	v	Canada,	2015	FC	1027	[PVLA].		
41	This	sentiment	is	especially	strong	in	the	US:	Lindstrum,	supra	note	30.	See	arguments	in	the	Canadian	
context	in	favour	of	sustainability	assessment	as	a	more	substantive	version	of	environmental	
assessment:	Sinclair	supra	note	27;	Robert	B	Gibson,	“Sustainability	Assessment:	Basic	Components	of	a	
Practical	Approach”	(2006)	24:3	Impact	Assessment	and	Project	Appraisal	170.		
42	House	of	Commons,	Standing	Committee	on	Environment	and	Sustainable	Development,	Statutory	
Review	of	the	Canadian	Environmental	Assessment	Act:	Protecting	the	Environment,	Managing	our	
Resources	(March	2012).	
43	Legislative	Assembly,	Official	Report	of	Debates	(Hansard),41st	Parl,	1st	Sess,	No	115	(2	May	2012)	at	
1550.	
44	This	was	a	direct	response	to	the	Supreme	Court’s	decision	in	MiningWatch,	supra	note	37.	
45	Meinhard	Doelle,	“CEAA	2012:	The	End	of	Federal	EA	as	We	Know	it?”	(2012)	24	JELP	1	at	1-2	[Doelle	
2012].	
46	Ibid.	
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with	the	Act’s	legislated	7-year	review.47	It	turned	out	that	these	changes	were	only	a	precursor	
to	a	second	wave	of	changes	that	ushered	in	the	complete	reshaping	of	federal	environmental	
assessment	 in	2012.	After	an	abridged	 legislative	review,	conducted	over	only	a	 few	weeks	by	
the	Standing	Committee	on	Environment	and	Sustainable	Development,	the	repeal	of	CEAA	and	
enactment	 of	 CEAA	 2012	 were	 proposed	 in	 the	 2012	 Budget	 Implementation	 Bill	 (Bill	 C-38).	
After	only	two	months	in	the	House	of	Commons	and	the	rejection	of	all	proposed	amendments	
to	CEAA	2012	 provisions,	 Bill	 C-38	was	 passed	 in	 June	 2012.	 Later	 in	 the	 same	 year,	 Bill	 C-45	
introduced	additional	changes	to	CEAA	2012,	 increasing	the	amount	of	discretion	delegated	to	
decision-makers	under	the	Act.48	
	
The	 previous	 version	 of	 CEAA	 was	 by	 no	 means	 perfect.49	But	 the	 2012	 changes	 to	
environmental	assessment	are	a	dramatic	retreat	in	the	face	of	strong	international	trends	and	
academic	commentary	in	favour	of	a	gradually	expanding	role	for	environmental	assessment	in	
terms	 of	 proposals	 considered,	 public	 participation	 and	 the	 objectives	 served.50	For	 example,	
experience	 with	 project-specific	 environmental	 assessment	 revealed	 the	 need	 for	 strategic	
environmental	assessment	of	higher-level	policy	and	programmatic	decisions	in	order	to	assess	
social	 and	 environmental	 effects	 systematically	 rather	 than	 through	 a	 piecemeal,	 project-by-
project	approach.51		
	
In	 contrast	 to	 this	 trend	 of	 inclusivity,	 Harper’s	 rewriting	 of	 federal	 environmental	
assessment	created	a	highly	exclusive	assessment	regime.	This	part	focuses	on	three	major	ways	
in	which	federal	environmental	assessment	was	narrowed.	52	First,	the	Act	substantially	reduces	
the	 number	 of	 projects	 that	 require	 an	 environmental	 assessment.	 Second,	 the	 Act	 defines	
environmental	 effects	 narrowly	 to	only	 include	 some	effects	within	 federal	 jurisdiction.	 Third,	
the	 Act	 reduces	 the	 role	 for	 public	 participation	 in	 environmental	 assessment.	 The	 legacy	 of	
these	changes	is	impoverished	public	decision-making,	which	is	now	less	informed	by	potential	
impacts	on	the	environment.	
	
																																																								
47	Ibid	at	2.	
48	Jobs	and	Growth	Act,	supra	note	4,	ss	435-432.	
49	For	a	brief	summary	of	perennial	issues,	see:	Robert	B	Gibson,	“In	Full	Retreat:	The	Canadian	
Government’s	New	Environmental	Assessment	Law	Undoes	Decades	of	Progress”	(2012)	30:3	Impact	
Assessment	and	Project	Appraisal	179	at	179-80	[Gibson	2012].	
50	Gibson	2012,	supra	note	49	at	179;	Denis	Kirchhoff,	Holly	L	Gardner	and	Leonard	JS	Tsuji,	“The	Canadian	
Environmental	Assessment	Act,	2012	and	Associated	Policy:	Implications	for	Aboriginal	Peoples”	(2013)	
4:3	The	International	Indigenous	Policy	Journal	1	at	9	[Kirchhoff	2013];	Donald	McGillivray	and	Jane	
Holder,	“Taking	Stock”	in	Jane	Holder	and	Donald	McGillivray,	eds,	Taking	Stock	of	Environmental	
Assessment	(Abingdon,	UK:	Routledge-Cavendish,	2006)	1	at	3.	
51	Robert	B	Gibson	et	al,	“Strengthening	Strategic	Environmental	Assessment	in	Canada:	An	Evaluation	of	
Three	Basic	Options”(2010)	20:3	JELP	175;	Bram	F	Noble,	“Promise	and	Dismay:	The	State	of	Strategic	
Environmental	Assessment	Systems	and	Practices	in	Canada”	(2009)	29:1	Environmental	Impact	
Assessment	Review	66.		
52	For	a	more	comprehensive	account	of	the	changes	to	the	CEAA	see	Doelle	2012,	supra	note	45.	
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Only	projects	that	are	specifically	designated	by	regulations	are	subject	to	CEAA	2012’s	
environmental	 assessment	 requirements,	 subject	 to	 the	 residual	 discretion	 of	 the	Minister	 of	
the	 Environment	 to	 order	 an	 environmental	 assessment	 for	 a	 project	 not	 otherwise	
designated.53	However,	even	designated	projects	can	be	exempt	 from	a	 federal	environmental	
assessment	 if	 they	 undergo	 an	 equivalent	 provincial	 assessment.54	The	 previous	 legislation	
essentially	required	an	assessment	for	any	project	that	required	the	exercise	of	federal	authority	
(e.g.	 an	 approval	 from	 Fisheries	 and	 Oceans	 to	 alter	 fish	 habitat).55	The	 default	 under	 the	
previous	legislation,	in	other	words,	was	that	a	project	was	included	in	the	regime,	unless	it	was	
specifically	 excluded. 56 	In	 contrast,	 CEAA	 2012	 reverses	 this	 default	 rule;	 only	 projects	
specifically	designated	as	“in”	potentially	require	federal	assessment.57		
	
CEAA	 2012	 further	 narrows	 the	 role	 of	 environmental	 assessment	 by	 requiring	 the	
Canadian	 Environmental	 Assessment	 Agency	 (CEA	 Agency)	 to	 make	 an	 initial	 decision	 about	
whether	any	designated	project	in	fact	requires	an	assessment.58	Even	designated	projects	may	
not	 require	 an	 assessment	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 summary	 determination	 that	 they	 will	 not	 cause	
significant,	adverse	environmental	effects.	This	mechanism,	in	other	words,	contradicts	the	very	
purpose	of	environmental	assessment	by	assuming	that	a	decision-maker	is	able	to	confidently	
determine	in	advance,	and	without	the	benefit	of	an	actual	assessment,	which	projects	are	likely	
to	cause	significant	environmental	harm.	
	
The	 result	 has	 been	 a	 striking	 reduction	 in	 the	 number	 of	 federal	 environmental	
assessments	 conducted	 each	 year.	 The	 immediate	 effect	 of	 CEAA	 2012	 was	 to	 cancel	
approximately	 3,000	 ongoing	 assessments.59	Since	 then,	 the	 number	 of	 completed	 federal	
environmental	 assessments	 has	 dropped	 from	 over	 6,000	 annually	 under	 the	 previous	
legislation60	to	only	about	a	dozen	each	year.61	This	is	because	the	lowest	level	of	assessment,	a	
“screening”	which	accounted	 for	approximately	99%	of	assessments	under	 the	prior	 regime,62	
																																																								
53	CEAA	2012,	supra	note	27,	s	14(2)	
54	Ibid	s	32.		
55	CEAA,	supra	note	27,	s	5.	The	requirements	for	triggering	the	CEAA	(1995)	were	in	fact	more	complex	
because	they	were	drafted	in	a	way	to	preclude	constitutional	challenge.	For	a	more	detailed	discussion	
see:	Doelle	2008,	supra	note	32	at	86.	
56	Exclusion	List	Regulations,	2007,	SOR/2007-108;	Exclusion	List	Regulations,	SOR/94-639.	
57	Regulations	Designating	Physical	Activities,	SOR/2012-147,	s	2-3.	Again,	it	is	slightly	more	complex	than	
this	because	there	is	residual	discretion	of	the	Minister	to	order	an	assessment	for	something	not	on	the	
list.	
58	CEAA	2012	supra	note	27,	s	10.	See	also	the	requirements	for	projects	on	federal	lands	and	outside	of	
Canada:	ss	67,	68.	
59	Kirchhoff	2013,	supra	note	50	at	5.	
60	These	numbers	are	from	the	publicly-reported	information	on	the	CEAA	Registry.	In	2006,	2007,	and	
2008,	respectively	there	were	5216,	6647,	3983	environmental	assessments	completed.	
61	These	numbers	are	from	the	CEA	Registry.	In	2013,	2014,	and	2015,	respectively,	there	were	15,	11	and	
12	environmental	assessments	completed.		
62	Doelle	2012,	supra	note	45	at	4.	
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was	eliminated	by	CEAA	2012.	When	a	project	 is	determined	 to	 require	an	assessment	under	
CEAA	2012,	it	now	proceeds	either	through	a	standard	“assessment”63	or	a	“panel	review.”64		
	
Second,	 CEAA	 2012	 redefines	 the	 “environmental	 effects”	 to	 be	 considered	 in	 an	
environmental	 assessment.	 The	 previous	 legislation	 defined	 environmental	 effects	 broadly	 to	
include	 “any	 change	 that	 the	 project	may	 cause	 in	 the	 environment.”65	The	 courts	 have	 held	
that	 it	 was	 constitutionally	 permissible	 for	 federal	 departments	 to	 consider	 environmental	
effects	even	when	those	effects	were	subjects	of	provincial	jurisdiction.66	In	contrast,	CEAA	2012	
defines	 environmental	 effects	 only	 as	 some	 components	 of	 the	 environment	 within	 federal	
jurisdiction	 (e.g.	 fish	 and	 fish	 habitat,	 migratory	 birds,	 changes	 to	 federal	 lands,	 effects	 on	
aboriginal	peoples).67	The	definition	of	environmental	effects	“covers	only	a	small	fraction	of	the	
interconnected	 biophysical	 effects	 that	 are	 included	 in	 the	 minimum	 usual	 scope	 of	
environmental	assessments	globally.”68	The	effect	of	such	a	change	is	that	the	federal	decision-
maker	must	now	base	his/her	decision	on	a	restricted	understanding	of	environmental	effects.	
In	light	of	the	specificity	of	the	effects	considered,	it	is	much	less	likely	that	the	decision-maker	
will	make	a	finding	of	significant	adverse	environmental	effects.69	It	is	further	unlikely	that	such	
a	narrow	understanding	of	environmental	effects	can	provide	a	sufficient	basis	for	determining	
whether	a	project	can	be	justified	in	the	circumstances.70	As	a	result,	only	a	joint	environmental	
assessment	 by	 the	 province	 and	 federal	 government	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 result	 in	 a	 fulsome	
assessment	of	a	proposal’s	environmental	effects.	
	
CEAA	 2012	 has	 extensive	 implications	 for	 public	 participation.	 The	 most	 significant	
change	 is	 the	 reduction	 in	 the	 number	 of	 environmental	 assessments,	 which	 removes	
consideration	of	these	project	proposals	from	the	public	sphere.	Under	the	previous	legislation,	
projects	subject	to	screenings	at	least	required	online,	publicly-accessible	records	of	the	project	
and	 assessment.71	Since	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 these	 projects	 no	 longer	 fall	 under	 the	 scope	 of	
federal	environmental	assessment,	there	is	no	public	notice	of	the	proposal.	And	it	is	not	safe	to	
assume	 that	 provincial	 environmental	 assessment	 regimes	 will	 fill	 in	 these	 gaps,	 as	 the																																																									
63	CEAA	2012,	supra	note	27,	ss	15-20.	
64	Ibid,	ss	39-48.	
65	Ibid,	s	2.	
66	E.g.	West	Country,	supra	note	38	at	para	34.	
67	CEAA	2012,	supra	note	27,	s	5.	Notably	it	leaves	out	climate	change.	Other	factors	are	narrowed	or	
eliminated:	e.g.	alternative	means	instead	of	alternatives	to	the	project	(s	19):	Gibson	2012,	supra	note	49	
at	184.	
68	Ibid	at	182.		
69	Ibid	at	184.	In	the	case	of	panel	reviews,	which	have	a	largely	unchanged	format,	the	assessment	is	
“unrecognizable	to	anyone	familiar	with	panel	reviews	under	CEAA	1995”:	Doelle	2012,	supra	note	45	at	
10.	
70	Gibson	2012,	supra	note	49	at	185.	
71	CEAA,	supra	note	27	at	ss	55-55.6.	Additional	public	participation	for	a	screening	was	at	the	discretion	
of	the	Minister	(s	18(3)).	See	Inverhuron	&	District	Ratepayers'	Assn.	v.	Canada	(Minister	of	The	
Environment),	2000	CanLII	15291	(FC);	Lavoie	v.	Canada	(Minister	of	The	Environment),	2000	CanLII	15896	
(FC).		
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application	of	provincial	legislation	can	also	be	quite	narrow.72	For	projects	subject	to	CEAA	2012	
requirements,	public	participation	is	constrained	by	tight	legislated	timelines.	For	example,	the	
public	only	has	20	days	to	comment	on	whether	a	designated	project	should	be	assessed	under	
the	Act.73	While	projects	that	undergo	an	assessment	are	subject	to	public	notice-and-comment	
requirements,74	CEAA	 2012	 narrowly	 redefines	 a	 class	 of	 participant,	 the	 “interested	 party.”75	
Only	 if	 an	 individual	 is	 an	 interested	 party,	 that	 is	 “directly	 affected…[or]	 has	 relevant	
information	or	expertise,”76	is	she/he	entitled	to	full	participation	in	a	panel	review.	
	
The	 benefits	 of	 public	 participation	 in	 environmental	 assessment	 have	 been	 widely	
noted.77	Historically,	public	participants	have	proven	to	be	the	“most	motivated	and	often	most	
effective	 in	 ensuring	 careful	 and	 critical	 review	 of	 project	 proposals	 and	 associated	
environmental	 assessment	 work.”78	Local	 knowledge	 and	 citizen	 concerns	 are	 an	 important	
counterbalance	to	the	fact	that	the	proponent	is	otherwise	the	sole	source	of	information	about	
the	effects	of	the	proposed	project.		
	
The	 massive	 reduction	 in	 public	 participation	 under	 CEAA	 2012	 will	 lead	 to	 poorer	
environmental	decisions,	but	it	also	sends	a	strong	signal	about	whose	interests	really	matter	in	
Harper’s	 vision	 of	 the	 environment.	 The	 changes	 disproportionately	 undermine	 Indigenous	
participation,	groups	who	are	often	the	most	closely	affected	by	development	projects,	and	who	
often	already	 face	 substantial	barriers	 to	participation	due	 to	 remote	 locations	and/or	 lack	of	
resources	and	capacity	to	effectively	intervene.79	Moreover,	CEAA	2012	excludes	or	marginalizes	
individuals	and	groups	with	issue-specific	concerns,	such	as	climate	change.80	The	result	 is	that	
environmental	 decisions	 are	 based	 on	 skewed	 understandings	 of	 the	 possible	 environmental	
effects	of	a	project,	and	have	led	to	“a	collapse	in	the	role	of	formal	decision-making	processes	
as	mechanisms	for	producing	decisions	which	are	seen	as	legitimate	and	therefore	likely	to	win																																																									
72	E.g.,	Environmental	Assessment	Act	SBC	2002,	c	43	(where	the	thresholds	for	designated	projects	is	
quite	high	and	subject	to	change	for	political	expediency:	Colin	Payne,	“BC	Gov	Backtracks	on	
Environmental	Assessment	Exemption	Decision”	The	Castlegar	Source	(15	April	2014)	online:	
<http://castlegarsource.com/news/updated-bc-gov-backtracks-environmental-assessment-exemption-
decision-30930>)	.	
73	CEAA	2012,	supra	note	27,	s	10	
74	Ibid,	ss	17,	24	
75	Ibid,		2(1).	
76	Ibid,	s	2(2).	See	also	Geoffrey	H	Salomons	and	George	Hoberg,	“Setting	boundaries	of	participation	in	
environmental	impact	assessment”	(2014)	45	Environmental	Impact	Assessment	Review	69	at	70	(on	how	
the	“directly	affected”	requirement	tends	to	privilege	private	property	interests	and	geographic	proximity	
which	does	not	always	reflect	the	nature	of	the	environmental	issues	under	assessment)	[Salomons	and	
Hoberg].	
77	Doelle	2008,	supra	note	32	at	32;	Alan	Bond	et	al,	“Impact	Assessment:	Eroding	Benefits	Through	
Streamlining?”	(2014)	45	Environmental	Impact	Assessment	46	at	48;	Ibid,	at	70;	Sinclair,	supra	note	27.	
78	Gibson	2012,	supra	note	49	at	183-4;	Sinclair,	supra	note	27	at	416	
79	Kirchhoff	2013,	supra	note	50	at	10.	
80	Kirsten	Mikadze,	“Pipelines	and	the	Changing	Face	of	Public	Participation”	(2016)	29	JELP	83	at	87,	104-
105;	Dayna	Nadine	Scott,	“Situating	Sarnia:	‘Unimgained	Communities’	in	the	New	National	Energy	
Debate”	(2013)	25	JELP	81.		
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acceptance	 among	 the	 affected	 parties.”81	The	 formal	 decision-making	 processes,	 contrary	 to	
their	original	purpose,	become	yet	another	source	of	controversy	and	dispute.		
	
In	sum,	the	extent	of	the	changes	made	to	federal	environmental	assessment	have	leading	
commentators	now	arguing	that	what	remains	no	longer	counts	as	environmental	assessment.82	
According	to	Doelle,	 the	new	regime	simply	gathers	“information	already	required	 for	existing	
federal	regulatory	decisions”83	Similarly,	Gibson	notes	that	the	new	Act	“positions	assessment	as	
a	 post-planning	 regulatory	 hoop	 inevitably	 under	 pressure	 for	 speedy	 decisions	 that	 do	 not	
require	 substantial	 changes	 to	 the	 established	 plans.” 84 	The	 Act,	 in	 his	 view,	 “gets	 its	
streamlining	 chiefly	 by	undermining	 effectiveness.”85	The	 result,	 in	 other	words,	 is	 a	 legacy	of	
public	 decision-making	 that	 does	 not,	 in	 any	 robust	 way,	 attempt	 to	 anticipate	 the	
environmental	consequences	of	the	exercise	of	public	authority.	
	
	
III. The	 Legacy	 Part	 II:	 Eroding	 the	 Commitment	 to	 a	 Democratic	 Conception	 of	 the	
Rule	of	Law	
	
Harper’s	 legacy	 in	 environmental	 assessment	 is	 more	 fundamental	 than	 poorly-informed	
environmental	decisions;	 it	 is	also	a	legacy	of	undermining	Canada’s	commitment	to	governing	
under	a	democratic	conception	of	the	rule	of	law.	This	part	extends	on	existing	critiques	of	CEAA	
2012	in	three	ways.	First,	it	argues	that	informed	decisions	and	public	participation	are	internal	
to	a	democratic	conception	of	the	rule	of	law,	at	least	when	we	understand	the	rule	of	law	in	a	
more	demanding	sense	than	minimal	compliance	with	a	statutory	norm.	Second,	it	argues	that,	
because	 of	 the	 special	 quasi-constitutional	 role	 of	 environmental	 assessment	 law	 in	 enabling	
public	justification,	the	changes	to	federal	environmental	assessment	ought	to	be	understood	as	
an	attempt	to	exempt	environmental	decision-making	from	the	requirements	of	the	rule	of	law.	
Third,	 reframing	 existing	 critiques	 of	 CEAA	 2012	 in	 rule-of-law	 terms	 provides	 a	 basis	 for	
understanding	 the	 ongoing	 obligations	 of	 our	 public	 institutions	with	 respect	 to	 the	 deficient	
legislation.		
	
The	 rule	 of	 law,	 as	 is	 often	 noted,	 is	 an	 “essentially	 contested	 concept.” 86 	The	
conception	of	the	rule	of	law	advanced	here	is	the	idea	that	public	officials	must	publicly	justify	
their	 decisions	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 core	 constitutional	 principles.	 It	 is	 a	 conception	 elaborated	 by	
Dyzenhaus,	who	states	that	its	basic	content	is	that		
	
																																																								
81	Winfield,	supra	note	35		at	145-146.	
82	Doelle	2012,	supra	note	45	at	15;	Gibson	2012,	supra	note	49	at	179.	
83	Doelle	2012,	supra	note	45	at	15.		
84	Gibson	2012,	supra	note	49	at	183.	
85	Ibid	at	185.	
86	WB	Gallie,	‘Essentially	Contested	Concepts’	(1955)	56	Proceedings	of	the	Aristotelian	Society	167,	169.	
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legislation	must	be	capable	of	being	interpreted	in	such	a	way	that	it	can	be	enforced	in	
accordance	with	 the	 requirements	 of	 due	 process:	 the	 officials	who	 implement	 it	 can	
comply	with	a	duty	to	act	fairly,	reasonably	and	in	a	fashion	that	respects	the	equality	of	
all	those	who	are	subject	to	the	law	and	independent	judges	are	entitled	to	review	the	
decisions	of	these	officials	to	check	that	they	do	so	comply.87	
	
This	understanding	of	the	rule	of	law	is	a	version	of	common	law	constitutionalism,	which	posits	
that	the	common	law	 is	a	source	of	deep-seated	principles	that	are	refined	over	time	through	
the	 practice	 of	 giving	 reasons.	 Two	 of	 these	 common	 law	 principles	 are	 fairness	 and	
reasonableness,	which	 are	 expressed	 through	basic	 administrative	 law	 requirements	 enforced	
by	 judicial	 review.	Together	they	give	rise	to	an	obligation	on	public	officials	 to	publicly	 justify	
their	decisions	on	 the	basis	of	 these	principles.	That	 is,	public	officials	must	demonstrate	 that	
their	decisions	are	both	fair	and	reasonable.		
	
The	 requirement	 of	 public	 justification	 has	 been	 repeatedly,	 though	 imperfectly,	
identified	by	 the	 Supreme	Court	 of	 Canada.	 The	 fullest	 expression	of	 a	 requirement	 of	 public	
justification	was	by	the	Court	in	Baker,	which	imposed	an	obligation	on	administrative	officials,	
in	 some	 instances,	 to	 offer	 reasons	 for	 their	 decisions	 that	 demonstrate	 that	 they	 exercised	
discretion	in	accordance	with	core	principles	of	Canadian	law.88		The	Court’s	watershed	decision	
in	 Dunsmuir	 later	 highlighted	 the	 role	 of	 reasonableness	 review	 in	 ensuring	 “justification,	
transparency	and	intelligibility	within	the	decision-making	process.”89	
	
These	 core	 common	 law	 principles	 are	 constitutional	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 are	
constitutive	of	law.	In	Dyzenhaus’s	words,	“you	cannot	have	rule	by	law	without	rule	of	law.”90	
Put	 differently,	 it	 is	 compliance	 with	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 (i.e.	 public	 justification	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
common	law	principles)	that	gives	a	public	decision	the	quality	of	law.	Legislation	that	conforms	
to	Fuller’s	well-known	 indicia	of	 the	 rule	of	 law	 (publicity,	 generality,	prospectivity,	etc)	 is	 the	
first	 step	 in	 complying	 with	 the	 requirement	 of	 public	 justification	 because	 it	 puts	 the	
implementation	 of	 the	 legislation	 under	 the	 supervision	 of	 the	 courts.	 When	 a	 would-be	
lawmaker	fails	to	comply	with	the	rule	of	law,	as	in	the	case	of	Fuller’s	allegorical	King	Rex,91	she	
fails	to	make	law.	And	when	a	 legislature	attempts	to	exempt	government	action	from	judicial	
supervision,	by	for	example	clearly	and	explicitly	suspending	the	application	of	basic	due	process	
requirements,	 such	 a	 law	 may	 be	 valid	 but	 it	 lacks	 the	 quality	 of	 law	 that	 gives	 it	 its	 legal	
																																																								
87	David	Dyzenhaus,	The	Constitution	of	Law:	Legality	in	a	Time	of	Emergency,	(Cambridge	University	
Press,	2006),	12-3.	
88	Baker	v	Canada	(Minister	of	Citizenship	and	Immigration)	[1999]	2	SCR	817	at	para	56.	
89	Dunsmuir	v	New	Brunswick	2008	SCC	9	at	para	47.	
90	David	Dyzenhaus,	“Accountability	and	the	Concept	of	(Global)	Administrative	Law	(2009)	Acta	Juridica	3	
at	6.		
91	Lon	L	Fuller,	The	Morality	of	the	Law,	Rev	ed	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1969)	at	33-41.		
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authority.92	On	this	view,	the	rule	of	law	requires,	not	only	that	legislation	possesses	formal	rule-
of-law	features,	it	also	requires	that	whenever	and	however	that	legislation	comes	into	contact	
with	the	lives	of	individuals,	its	implementation	is	publicly	justified.		
	
The	 rule	of	 law,	on	 this	 view,	 is	 constitutive	of	a	particular	 relationship	between	 legal	
subject,	the	individual	subject	to	the	law,	and	lawmaker.	Compliance	with	the	rule	of	law	means	
law	 is	 in	 a	 form	 that	 legal	 subjects	 can	understand,	deliberate	upon	and	 contest	on	 the	basis	
that	 it	 does	 not	 reflect	 core	 constitutional	 principles.	 It	 allows,	 in	 other	words,	 individuals	 to	
“reason	with	 the	 law.”93	Importantly,	 however,	 this	 conception	of	 the	 rule	of	 law	 can	only	 be	
realized	within	a	deliberative	democracy,94	in	which	individuals	expect	every	exercise	of	power	
to	be	 justified	and	“in	which	 leadership	given	by	government	rests	on	the	cogency	of	the	case	
offered	 in	 defence	 of	 its	 decisions,	 not	 the	 fear	 inspired	 by	 the	 force	 at	 its	 command.”95	It	 is	
therefore	 a	 democratic	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 because	 individual	 participation	 is	
simultaneously	essential	to	its	realization	and	enabled	by	its	fulfillment.	
	
The	 public-justification	 conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 imposes	 on	 environmental	
decision-makers	 obligations	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 their	 decisions	 are	 reasonable	 and	 fair.96	In	
other	words,	reasonable,	 informed	environmental	decisions	that	are	procedurally	 fair	 to	those	
affected	are	requirements	of	the	rule	of	law.	When	environmental	decisions	comply	with	these	
requirements	 they	 have	 the	 authority	 of	 law. 97 	From	 this	 perspective,	 environmental	
assessment	 performs	 a	 quasi-constitutional	 role	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 environmental	 assessment,	
when	 it	 enables	public	 participation	 and	 generates	 reasoned	decisions,	 is	 constitutive	of	 legal	
authority	 in	environmental	 law.	Recall	 that	 this	 is,	 at	present,	a	unique	 role,	because	 the	vast	
majority	of	federal	environmental	decision-making	is	not	meaningfully	subject	to	the	rule-of-law	
requirements	of	fairness	and	reasonableness.	
	
We	 are	 now	 in	 position	 to	 see	 how	 the	 extensive	 changes	 to	 federal	 environmental	
assessment	law	not	only	undermine	environmental	protection;	they	can	also	be	interpreted	as	
an	 attempt	 to	 exempt	 environmental	 decision-making	 from	 the	 fundamental	 rule-of-law	
requirement	 of	 public	 justification.	 The	 clearest	 evidence	 of	 this	 exemption	 from	 public																																																									
92	Dyzenhaus	analogizes	this	to	the	effect	of	s	33	of	the	Charter,	where	the	unconstitutional	law	does	not	
cease	to	be	unconstitutional	even	though	it	is	legally	valid:	David	Dyzenhaus,	The	Constitution	of	Law:	
Legality	in	a	Time	of	Emergency	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006)	at	211.	
93	Supra	note	24.	
94	Dyzenhaus	Legitimacy,	supra	note	23	at	162.	
95	Etienne	Mureinik,	“A	Bridge	to	Where?	Introducing	the	Interim	Bill	of	Rights”	(1994)	10	South	African	
Journal	on	Human	Rights	31	at	32.	
96	I	have	written	elsewhere	on	how	environmental	principles,	such	as	the	precautionary	principle,	inform	
these	requirements:	Jocelyn	Stacey,	The	Constitution	of	the	Environmental	Emergency	(2016)	
[unpublished,	archived	at	McGill	University	Faculty	of	Law	Library].		
97	This	understanding	of	the	rule	of	law	provides	an	explanation	for	Winfield’s	observation	that	the	
changes	to	environmental	assessment	have	undermined	its	legitimacy	as	a	formal	decision-making	
process:	supra	note	81.	
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justification	 is	 that	 the	vast	majority	of	 federal	 environmental	decisions	now	proceed	without	
having	 first	 undergone	a	 federal	 environmental	 assessment.	 The	 result	 is	 that	 these	decisions	
are	 made	 with	 minimal	 legal	 constraints	 on	 environmental	 decision-makers.	 Permits	 and	
approvals	 for	 pollution	 and	 environmental	 degradation	 are	 made	 without	 any	 public	 notice,	
public	 input,	 reasons	 for	 the	 decision	 and,	 consequently,	 no	 opportunity	 for	 independent	
review.98		
	
Even	where	an	assessment	does	occur,	 it	 is	not	clear	 that	 the	 legislative	requirements	
can	 produce	 publicly-justified	 decisions.	 For	 example,	 the	 Act’s	 explicit	 requirement	 that	 the	
effects	 of	 a	 project	 be	 “justified	 in	 the	 circumstances”	 cannot,	 in	 its	 current	 form,	 amount	 to	
adequate	 public	 justification.	 Public	 justification	 requires	 decisions	 to	 be	 reasonable,	 i.e.	
supported	by	 reasons	 that	 reflect	 the	purposes	of	 the	 legislation	and	 relevant	 considerations.	
The	narrow	definition	of	environmental	effects	renders	the	Act’s	purpose,	“to	encourage	federal	
authorities	to	take	actions	that	promote	sustainable	development	in	order	to	achieve	a	healthy	
environment	 and	 a	 healthy	 economy”99	meaningless.	 A	 “healthy	 environment”	 is	 one	 that	
includes	 far	 more	 than	 the	 highly	 circumscribed	 environmental	 effects	 defined	 in	 the	 Act.	
Moreover,	 any	 justification	 decision	 is	 inevitably	 based	 on	 a	 disproportionate	 balancing	 of	
economic	 benefits	 and	 environmental	 harm,	 where	 the	 government	 (presumably)	 takes	 into	
account	all	possible	economic	benefits100	but	only	the	environmental	effects	that	engage	federal	
authority.	 Absent	 some	 compelling	 argument	 for	 the	 differential	 inclusion	 of	 economic	 and	
environmental	effects,	an	environmental	assessment	decision	premised	on	such	a	skewed	basis	
is	not	reasonable.	
	
Framing	CEAA	2012	 in	 rule-of-law	terms	also	reveals	 that	Harper’s	process	of	enacting	
new	 legislation	 through	 unprecedentedly	 large	 omnibus	 bills	was	 entirely	 consistent	with	 the	
substance	 of	 the	 new	 legislation.	 On	 one	 level,	 the	 rationale	 both	 for	 the	 use	 of	 omnibus	
legislation	and	 the	overhaul	 in	environmental	assessment	was	economic	stimulus.	On	another	
level,	they	can	both	be	understood	as	attempts	to	undermine	the	commitment	to	a	democratic	
conception	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 The	 requirement	 of	 public	 justification	 sits	 at	 the	 interface	
between	 the	 rule	of	 law	and	deliberative	democracy.	This	means	 that	 legislators	 are	not	only	
political	 actors	 within	 a	 deliberative	 democracy	 that	 generate	 reasons	 that	 they	 hope	 their	
constituents	will	accept.	They	are	also	legal	actors	who	perform	a	legal	role	by	putting	in	motion	
a	 process	 of	 lawmaking	 whereby	 legal	 subjects	 are	 able	 to	 receive	 the	 public	 justification	 to	
which	they	are	entitled.	In	other	words,	the	legal	obligation	of	legislators	is	to	debate	in	a	way	
																																																								
98	This	is	true	even	when	legislation	imposes	specific	substantive	requirements	on	the	executive.	E.g.,	s	6	
of	the	Fisheries	Act	lists	factors	that	the	Minister	must	consider,	but	there	is	no	way	to	know	whether	this	
requirement	is	met	because	the	approvals	are	not	publicly	accessible.	
99	CEAA	2012,	supra	note	27,	s	4(1)(h).	
100	How	could	one	discern	only	the	benefits	that	arise	from	the	aspects	of	the	project	that	engage	federal	
jurisdiction?	
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that	 ensures	 that	 when	 government	 implements	 that	 legislation,	 it	 is	 capable	 of	 being	
implemented	in	a	manner	that	complies	with	the	requirement	of	public	justification.101	
	
What	are	the	implications	of	reframing	of	Harper’s	changes	to	CEAA	2012	in	rule-of-law	
terms?	 After	 all,	CEAA	 2012	 is	 a	 legally	 valid	 statute	 even	 if,	 as	 this	 account	 argues,	 it	 has	 a	
questionable	claim	to	 legal	authority.	Yet,	the	public-justification	conception	of	the	rule	of	 law	
imposes	 positive	 obligations	 on	 those	 public	 officials	 responsible	 for	 the	 administration	 and	
enforcement	of	the	Act.	Dyzenhaus	writes,	of	judges:		
	
they	must	take	the	legal	regime	that	Parliament	has	provided	and	read	into	it	whatever	
legal	 protections	 they	 can	…	because	 they	are	working	 as	 judges	within	 a	 legal	 order,	
and	 not	 as	 some	 other	 kind	 of	 official	 in	 some	 other	 kind	 of	 order;	 for	 example,	 the	
order	 Fuller	 described	 as	 managerial,	 in	 which	 the	 point	 of	 its	 structures	 is	 to	 make	
more	 efficient	 the	 transmission	 of	 commands	 from	 the	 top	 of	 the	 hierarchy	 to	 the	
bottom.102	
	
Such	a	requirement	extends	not	only	to	judges	but	all	the	legal	actors	working	within	the	legal	
system.	This	means,	for	example,	that	those	individuals	appointed	to	conduct	panel	reviews	(the	
most	 rigorous	 form	 of	 environmental	 assessment)	 have	 a	 legal	 obligation	 to	 justify	 decisions	
that	exclude	individuals	on	the	basis	that	they	are	not	“interested	parties”	under	the	legislation.	
That	specific	justification	would	have	to	reflect	the	Act’s	purpose	of	“provid[ing]	for	meaningful	
public	 participation,”103	the	 information-gathering	 function	 of	 environmental	 assessment,	 and	
the	potentially	far-reaching	environmental	effects	of	a	major	development	project.	
	
Moreover,	public	justification	requires	the	courts	to	play	a	reason-demanding	role	when	
conducting	judicial	review.	On	this	view,	it	is	unacceptable	for	a	court	to	find	that	a	justification	
decision	under	section	52	of	CEAA	2012	 is	 reasonable	 in	 the	absence	of	any	reasons	 justifying	
that	 decision.104	In	 instances	 where	 reasons	 have	 been	 offered	 and	 they	 demonstrate	 the	
legislated	bias	against	a	comprehensive	consideration	of	environmental	effects,	then	the	court	
ought	to	make	a	clear	statement	that	the	decision	formally	complies	with	the	legislation,	but	the	
legislation	 undermines	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 executive	 to	 make	 publicly	 justified	 decisions	 in	
accordance	with	the	rule	of	law.	The	effect	would	be	that	the	decision	is	legally	valid,	but	much	
like	 in	 the	 case	 of	 an	 Act	 covered	 by	 the	 notwithstanding	 clause,	 or	 a	 declaration	 of	
incompatibility	made	under	 the	United	 Kingdom	Human	Rights	Act,	 the	 court	 has	 alerted	 the	
public	to	the	legislation’s	questionable	claim	to	legal	authority.																																																									
101	David	Dyzenhaus,	“Deference,	Security	and	Human	Rights”	in	Ben	Goold	and	Liora	Lazarus	eds,	Security	
and	Human	Rights	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2007)	125	at	143.	
102	David	Dyzenhaus	“Preventive	Justice	and	the	Rule-of-Law	Project”	In	Andrew	Ashworth,	Lucia	Zedner	&		
Patrick	Tomlin,	eds,	Prevention	and	the	Limits	of	the	Criminal	Law	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013)	
at	113-4.	
103		CEAA	2012,	supra	note	27,	s	4(1)(e).	
104	PVLA,	supra	note	40.	
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In	 sum,	 this	 part	 has	 argued	 that	 environmental	 assessment	 is	 quasi-constitutional	 in	
the	sense	that	it	is	an	indispensible	site	of	public	justification	in	federal	environmental	decision-
making.	 It	 argued	 that	 part	 of	 Harper’s	 legacy,	 by	 enacting	 CEAA	 2012,	 fundamentally	
undermined	 the	 possibility	 of	 publicly	 justified	 environmental	 decisions.	 CEAA	 2012	 can	
therefore	be	understood	as	an	attempt,	by	the	Conservative-dominated	Parliament,	to	exempt	
environmental	 decision-making	 from	 democratic	 governance	 under	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Finally,	
understanding	the	changes	to	CEAA	2012	in	this	way	shows	how	it	is	possible,	and	indeed	a	rule-
of-law	 imperative,	 for	 the	 institutions	 tasked	with	 implementing	 and	 enforcing	CEAA	 2012	 to	
interpret	 the	 legislation	 in	 a	 way	 that	 preserves	 our	 commitment	 to	 a	 substantive	 and	
democratic	conception	of	the	rule	of	law.	
	
Conclusion	
	
This	 article	 argued	 that	 Harper’s	 legacy	 in	 environmental	 law	 has	 been	 to	 undermine	
environmental	protection	and	publicly-justified	environmental	decision-making.	In	conclusion,	it	
is	 worth	 looking	 ahead	 to	 see	what	 of	 this	 legacy	might	 survive	 the	 next	 government,	which	
campaigned	 on	 a	 radically	 different	 approach.	 I	 offer	 one	 prediction	 and	 one	 caution.	 The	
prediction	 is	 that	we	should	expect	 to	see	a	much	stronger	 role	 for	 Indigenous	environmental	
assessments	in	Canadian	environmental	law.	A	significant	byproduct	of	Harper’s	environmental	
legacy	was	the	galvanization	of	environmental	resistance	by	Indigenous	Canadians	through	the	
Idle	 No	 More	 movement. 105 	Moreover,	 in	 a	 direct	 response	 to	 the	 changes	 to	 federal	
environmental	assessment	law,	many	Indigenous	groups	have	begun	to	codify	and	enforce	their	
own	 Indigenous	 environmental	 assessment	 laws,	 which	 unsurprisingly	 contain	 fundamentally	
different	approaches	 to	environmental	assessment.106	The	Tsleil-Waututh	Nation,	 for	example,	
conceives	 of	 environmental	 assessment	 as	 a	 means	 to	 discharge	 responsibility	 to	 land	 and	
future	generations	and	to	determine	the	best	use	of	land.107	They	call	for	comprehensive	socio-
ecological	assessment	that	eschews	any	strong	division	between	people	and	the	environment.108	
This	 is	 a	 welcome	 development	 for	 Canadian	 environmental	 law,	 but	 one	 that	 undoubtedly	
poses	 further,	 deeper	 challenges	 for	 intergovernmental	 cooperation	 in	 environmental	
assessment,	cooperation	that	has	never	been	fully	realized	at	even	the	level	of	provincial-federal	
relations.	
	
The	 caution	 is	 that	 the	 changes	 to	 environmental	 assessment	may	 not	 be	 as	 easy	 to	
undo	as	they	may	seem.	Despite	the	overtness	of	Harper’s	environmental	agenda,	particularly																																																									
105	See	“The	Story”,	Idle	No	More,	online:	<http://www.idlenomore.ca/story>	;	“9	Questions	on	Idle	No	
More”	CBC	News	(5	January	2013),	online:	<http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/9-questions-about-idle-no-
more-1.1301843>	.	
106	See,	e.g.,	Tsleil-Waututh,	supra	note	31;	Jessica	Clogg	et	al,	“Indigenous	Legal	Traditions	and	the	Future	
of	Environmental	Governance	in	Canada”	(2016)	29	JELP	227.		
107	Tsleil-Waututh,	supra	note	31	at	12.	
108	Ibid	at	11-12.	
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with	 respect	 to	major	projects	 such	as	pipelines,	many	of	 the	 legal	 changes	 to	environmental	
assessment	 are	 subtler.	 In	 addition,	 these	 changes	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 well-worn	
characterization	 of	 environmental	 assessment	 as	 a	 purely	 formal	 and	mechanical	 exercise.	 A	
“streamlined”	 federal	 environmental	 assessment	 regime	 is	 entirely	 consistent	 with	 this	
characterization.	While	the	new	government	has	promised	environmental	assessment	reform,109	
the	 stop-gap	 measures	 proposed	 by	 the	 Trudeau	 government	 for	 two	 major	 interprovincial	
pipeline	proposals	may,	in	this	vein,	prove	prophetic.	These	measures	create	an	additional	step,	
after	the	CEAA	2012-assessment,	 in	which	the	government	will	conduct	 its	own	assessment	of	
the	 upstream	greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 associated	with	 the	 pipelines	 and	 conduct	 additional	
aboriginal	consultation.110	In	no	way	does	this	address	the	real	problem	of	CEAA	2012,	which	is	
its	 inability	 to	generate	 fair	 and	 reasoned	decisions.	This	article	 suggests	 that	 the	way	 for	 the	
Trudeau	environmental	legacy	to	supersede	Harper’s	is	to	begin	by	conceiving	of	environmental	
assessment	as	 the	 linchpin	 to	 its	 commitment	 to	environmental	governance	under	 the	 rule	of	
law.	
	
																																																								
109	Justin	Trudeau,	“Minister	of	Environment	and	Climate	Change	Mandate	Letter”,	Office	of	the	Prime	
Minister,	online:	<	http://pm.gc.ca/eng/minister-environment-and-climate-change-mandate-letter	>.	
110	Canada,	Natural	Resources	Canada,	“Interim	Measures	for	Pipeline	Reviews”,	online:	
<http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?mthd=tp&crtr.page=1&nid=1029989&crtr.tp1D=930>.	
